Is there a problem in attributing beliefs and
intentionality to animals?
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I

n Dr Seuss’s story, ‘What Was I Scared Of?’ 1 the protagonist 2
confronts a pair of levitating green trousers in a dark wood at night.
In spite of the fact that this is a rather strange situation in which to
find oneself, and that this other being is completely unknown to her,
our heroine - I shall henceforth refer to her as Everyperson immediately reacts as if these pants were behaving in accordance with
some sort of purpose or intention. This is evident in her account of the
situation:
I wasn’t scared. But, yet, I stopped.
What could those pants be there for?
What could a pair of pants at night
Be standing in the air for? 3
Although this account seems absurd because it takes the novelty of the
situation for granted, what Everyperson is doing is something which
most of us have engaged in at some time in our lives: interpreting the
behaviour of another being as if that being possessed beliefs and
intentions. In other words, Everyperson adopts what is sometimes
called the ‘Intentional Stance’ 4 towards the pants (which shall be known
henceforth as GP - short for Green Pants). As Dr Seuss’s tale unfolds,
Everyperson is able to determine, to what degree of precision it remains
unclear, the intentions of GP through acts of communication - most
importantly, verbal language. Everyperson and GP thereby become
Dr. Seuss, ‘What Was I Scared Of?’ in The Sneetches and Other Stories (William Collins
Sons & Co, London, 1961).
2 Although the protagonist is a hare-like creature (i.e. a non-human animal), Seuss
expects us to unproblematically identify with her as an intentional being. For the
purposes of this article, I will adopt the intentional stance toward this protagonist.
3 Seuss, ‘What Was I Scared Of?’ - original emphasis
4 This phrase was made famous by Daniel Dennett in his book of the same name, in
1987. I will discuss the intentional stance in more detail in Part I of this article.
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friendly acquaintances and engage with each other without further
problems.
In real life, such a situation would not be so clear cut. Philosophers and
scientists alike have realised that there are many problems in attributing
beliefs and intentions to other beings. For instance, even if we allow that
Everyperson’s initial judgement had been confirmed by the end of the
tale, most of us would agree that her immediate attribution of
intentionality to the pants was an intuitive reaction, based on little direct
evidence of the presence of beliefs or intentions.
At this point we might ask, ‘Well then, what is intentionality? and
where do beliefs and desires fit into this picture?’ My task in Part I of
this article is to answer these questions. I will show that the common
assumptions regarding intentionality tend to lead to more stringent
conditions for intentionality in relation to non-human animals than to
humans. The impact of such a double-standard on our perception of
non-human animal intentionality has been enormous. However, I will
leave the question of whether or not this is a tenable position aside for
the greater part of this article, and focus on the alleged problems of
attributing beliefs and intentions to all non-human animals, as this has
been the main focus of the current philosophical debate about
intentionality.
I will discuss the nature of intentionality as it is attributed to nonhuman animals in Part II, along with the assumptions inherent in our
views of what constitutes evidence for such. This leads to a discussion of
the issue of anthropomorphism in Part III.
In Part IV I will discuss the main issues pertaining to language as an
indication that a being is intentional. I will examine arguments such as
those of Regan and Stich, in which the issue of anthropocentrism, in
relation to the language debate, is highlighted.
In Part V I will discuss a popular alternative to the intentional stance animal behaviourism - which appears to have been adopted by
cognitive ethologists everywhere. Just as it was shown to be a very
narrow and problematic approach to human psychology some decades
ago, I will argue that behaviourism is equally inapplicable to nonhuman animals.
I will relate the issue of attributing beliefs and intentions to non-human
animals to the important ethical issues which are at stake in the question
of non-human intentionality in Part VI.
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In conclusion, I will re-evaluate Everyperson’s position in the light of
this discussion. My own intention is to show that those problems in
attributing beliefs and intentions to non-human animals, and indeed
other unclassified beings such as GP, which cannot be avoided through
exercising caution, are not enough to justify dismissing the intentional
stance.

Part I
The intentional stance is the strategy of interpreting
the behaviour of an entity (person, animal,
artefact, whatever) by treating it as if it were a
rational agent who governed its “choice” of “action”
by a “consideration” of its “beliefs” and “desires”. 5
Adopting the intentional stance towards a given being entails assuming
that the behaviour of this being can be explained and understood in
terms of its beliefs, desires and intentions, that is, what it thinks and feels.
An example of an intentional explanation would therefore be: ‘the cat is
scratching on the kitchen cupboard because he thinks the cat food is in
there’. Copeland contrasts intentional explanations, which refer to mind
states, with explanations which refer to brain states, such as
‘explanations of behaviour that are couched directly in terms of
electrical activity in the agent’s cortex’. 6 Intentional explanations, then,
focus on the content of the mind - primarily, beliefs and desires - which
are assumed to play some sort of causal role in relation to the behaviour
of living beings. In order to explain this role, it is important to say a
word about beliefs and desires themselves.
Beliefs and desires are intentional because they are ‘about’ something they exist in virtue of the fact that they have some sort of
representational content. Thus, I do not just have beliefs - I have a belief
that my friend is downstairs, or a desire to see my friend. We can therefore
say that beliefs and desires exhibit intentionality because they are
extensive. When we adopt the intentional stance, we assume that
behaviour is motivated by the interaction between a desire and one or
more congruent beliefs. Thus my behaviour of going downstairs and
saying hello to my friend Taliessin could be said to be indicative of my
D.C. Dennett, Kinds of Minds (Phoenix, London, 1996), p.35.
B.J. Copeland, Artificial Intelligence: A Philosophical Introduction (Basil Blackwell,
Oxford, 1993), p.56.
5
6
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belief that Taliessin is downstairs, coupled with my desire to see her.
Similarly, an intentional explanation of the behaviour of a polar bear
might be that ‘the bear is pounding on the ice above the den of a seal
because it has the belief that a seal is under the ice, and the desire to eat
that seal’. We derive the animal’s intentions from its (apparent) beliefs
and desires.
Such conclusions regarding intentions are likely to be based on the
premise that the being in question, whether human or not, is aware of
what it is doing and why: that it is conscious. Consciousness, like beliefs,
is intentional, and thus one must be conscious of something.
Some philosophers (such as Dennett 7 and Carruthers 8) have argued that
an additional type of belief exists, without which an intentional being
cannot be said to be conscious. This is known as a ‘second-order belief’,
which is simply a belief that I believe such and such.. 9 To be conscious,
argue these philosophers, a being must apply the belief that it has beliefs
to its beliefs of everything else, otherwise the consciousness has no
object. Second-order beliefs are much more abstract entities than
‘ordinary’ beliefs, and they are less likely to be manifested in behaviour
other than verbal. It is impossible to say whether or not non-human
animals possess such beliefs at all. Carruthers and others emphatically
deny such beliefs to non-human animals without being able to prove or
disprove such claims.
It is ultimately the issue of consciousness of non-human animals that is
at stake in the various debates about intentionality, and which has thus
rendered the attribution of intentionality to non-human animals
problematic. But besides these controversial issues, the intentional
stance itself, as a ‘strategy of interpreting behaviour’, 10 is not above
criticism.

Part II
One of the major problems in attributing intentionality to non-human
animals is the nature of the intentional stance which most of us tend to
Dennett, ‘Kinds of Minds’
P. Carruthers, The Animals Issue (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992)
9 This explanation of second-order belief is paraphrased from Carruthers, ‘The Animals
Issue’, p.178.
10 Dennett, ‘Kinds of Minds’, p.35.
7
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adopt. As Dennett has pointed out on numerous occasions, inherent in
this stance is the assumption that the being towards which we adopt
this stance is a rational being, whose beliefs and desires are accurately
reflected in, and
verifiable through observation of, their behaviour. 11
There are a considerable number of problems with such a stance. The
first is that the assumption of rationality is based on a secondary
assumption that the being in question will always reason to act in favour
of its own best interests, and thus that he/she knows what these are. This
is quite a stringent condition to apply to non-human animals, because
we cannot even say this of human beings, particularly young children or
the mentally ill. There is a tendency to fail to allow for the possibility
that non-human animals can, at times, be irrational - just like humans.
This attitude is obvious in David Attenborough’s explanation of polar
bear behaviour in the documentary Polar Bear. 12 Two young bears
engage in what appears to be aggressive behaviour, without doing
serious physical harm to one another. Attenborough explains that that
the polar bears are engaging in play fighting to prepare for their lives as
adult male bears, as if the bears desire to be strong adult bears, and believe
that ‘play-fighting’ will make them so. This explanation overlooks other
possibilities, such as the possibility that the bears may be engaging in
this activity for no other reason than that they enjoy doing so.
The reason for this oversight is that the assumption of rationality
usually leads to plausible explanations. Should we fail to take
rationality as a starting point, it would be an almost impossible task to
predict the most likely course of action of an intentional being. The
problem is that when non-rational or irrational behaviour appears
rational from an external point of view, the explanation which is
derived may fit the situation whilst simultaneously failing to reflect the
beliefs and desires behind the action. 13
Alternatively, we may mistake the ‘rational’ behaviour of animals for
irrational behaviour. Dennett gives the following example of a frog
which swallows a baited fishing line:

See especially D.C. Dennett, The Intentional Stance (MIT Press, Massachusetts, 1987).
D. Attenborough, Polar Bear , Produced by Martha Holmes and Keith Schole for BBC
Worldwide, Ltd., Sydney: ABC Video.
13 We are not freed from this dilemma automatically if we assume rationality whilst
granting that we are sometimes wrong in this assumption, for we have to be able to
recognise situations in which the agent is not or has not been rational. This brings us
back to our original question of interpretation.
11
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The frog has made a mistake, but exactly which
mistake(s) has it made? What did the frog “think”
it was grabbing? A fly? Airborne food? A moving
dark convexity? We language users can draw
indefinitely fine distinctions of content from the
candidate frog-thought. 14
Adopting the intentional stance, we therefore run the risk of grossly
misinterpreting the behaviour of non-human animals, and with it
attributing imprecise or incorrect beliefs and intentions. This error can
occur in varied cases. In Dennett's example, it occurs due to the
imprecision with which we ascribe particular intentions to a non-human
animal. Error may also occur in relation to the degree of precision with
which we isolate a behaviour which warrants an interpretation.
Thus another problem with adopting the intentional stance is that we
tend to apply the intentional stance to the whole of the non-human
animal's behaviour, assuming a rational explanation for all of it. This
approach allows no room for the errors which non-human animals
make, such as choosing an impractical location to build a nest, or
wandering off and being unable to find a way back to a community or
colony. We simply explain these as if the animals behaviour is an
accurate reflection of its belief-desire, and that we are interpreting it
correctly.
In fact, in the case of non-human animals, the only way we measure the
‘truth’ of an intentional account is against the standard of rationality: if
the explanation is reasonable and fits the picture, it is very likely to be
taken as an accurate and adequate explanation. This is problematic
because, as I have shown in this section, a rational explanation may not
give an accurate account of the beliefs and desires held by non-human
animals. Moreover, many rational explanations are available for the one
behaviour: there is no foolproof way of deciding which of these is the
appropriate explanation.

Part III
Here we expose the underlying anthropomorphism
of the intentional stance: we treat all intentional
systems as if they were just like us - which of course
14

Dennett, ‘Kinds of Minds’, p.51.
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they are not. 15
Fortunately for GP, GP’s beliefs and desires were of such a nature that
Everyperson’s interpretive strategies culminated in a more-or-less
accurate view (once corrected) of what GP’s behaviour was really
signalling. Everyperson simply based her interpretation on the
assumption that GP was just like herself.
Anthropomorphism is a problem which arises because the intentional
stance is a strategy for interpreting behaviour, and is necessarily applied
from a point of view. Thus the attribution of intentionality is subject to
the limits of the interpreter. Nagel illustrates this view in his essay,
‘What is it like to be a bat?,’ in which he argues that ‘the subjective
character of experience...is not analysable in terms of any explanatory
system of functional states, or intentional states’. 16 He emphasises the
fact that there are elements of subjective experience which are
inaccessible to observers. The implication is that these elements may
constitute data which are fed back into the mind, undetectably
influencing behaviour. Thus we can have a case where, in what we
perceive to be the exact same set of circumstances and environment, an
immeasurable qualitative difference may cause a being to interpret the
context in a different way.
Nagel’s essay is typically assumed to be a polemic against
anthropomorphism. Nagel does indeed argue against the practice of
assuming that we can know everything about the experience of another
creature (and therefore whether or not to attribute beliefs and intentions
to a particular creature). But if we take Nagel’s argument in the
strongest sense, 17 the implication is that human experience is so
different to the experience of non-human animals that we cannot
possibly gather the evidence required to attribute intentions and beliefs
to them. If we accept this conclusion, there is no reason to attribute
beliefs and intentions to non-human animals in the first place, as even if
we did, their beliefs and intentions may be so different to those which
we understand that we are no closer to understanding non-human
animals than we were in the first place. In other words, Nagel’s stance

Ibid., p.43.
T. Nagel, ‘What is it Like to be a Bat?’ in The Mind’s I: Fantasies and Reflections on Self
and Soul, composed and arranged by D.R. Hofstadter and D.C.Dennett (Penguin,
Hammondsworth, 1981).
17 As for instance Dennett has done. See Kinds of Minds in particular for such an
interpretation of Nagel’s argument.
15
16
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can lead to an anthropocentric 18 position in regard to beliefs and
intentions.
If we reject anthropomorphism altogether, this may lead to the attitude
that not only does it render an interpretation of non-human animal
behaviour unscientific, but that the fruits of an interpretation tainted
with this bias are wrong. This can lead to the situation which Dennett
describes in Kinds of Minds:
So where we recognise that much of what we
think of the awfulness of pain...involves
imagining...anthropomorphic accompaniments,
we generously decide that they are just
accompaniments, not “essential” to the brute
phenomenon of sentience. 19
Dennett’s remark brings to our attention the fact that the conclusion that
anthropomorphic interpretations are wrong does not follow from the
premise that such interpretations can be incorrect or inaccurate. We must
be careful not to jump to conclusions in either direction if we are really
to be faithful to a scientific approach. We should not dismiss the fact
that ‘anthropomorphic interpretations’ often appear to explain the beliefs
and intentions of non-human animal behaviour adequately, and
certainly allow us to predict their behaviour much of the time.
Furthermore, if we hold that humans evolved from a non-human
ancestry, we must accept that we will be similar to non-human animals
in a number of determined as well as a number of as yet undetermined
ways. Apparently ‘anthropomorphic’ explanations may be closer to the
truth than some would argue. To dismiss them would therefore be a
mistake. As Dennett states of the issue:
What we may tend to overlook...is the possibility
that we are subtracting, on one path, the very
thing we are seeking [ie. the correct explanation
of non-human animal behaviour] on the other. 20
Such a stance is said to be anthropocentric (as opposed to anthropomorphic) because
it preferences the human perspective and experience over any other perspective or
experience, namely that of non-human animals. In this case, the implication of the
anthropocentric viewpoint is that only what humans have experienced as a belief or
intention can be recognised as such. If the experience of a non-human animal is so alien
to us that we cannot discern its beliefs or intentions, the anthropocentric philosopher (if
one will permit what I see to be a gross contradiction in terms) will conclude that the
animal in question is not an intentional being as all. They do so because they are
looking for a distinctly human type of belief or intention.
19 Dennett, ‘Kinds of Minds’, p.128.
18
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As for anthropocentrism, this is a problem which needs to be overcome
even by those championing the existence of consciousness in nonhuman animals. A case in point is Tom Regan’s discussion, in which he
effectively divides animals into two distinct and mutually exclusive
groups 21: humans and non-human animals. 22 This approach is useful to
some extent, but it tends to render invisible or even insignificant the
differences between animal species in relation to the intentionality
debate. It may well be that some animals have beliefs and intentions,
whilst others do not. Such a possibility is denied in Regan’s sweeping
statement that ‘even if primates show that they are able to use a
language [and thereby show that they have beliefs and intentions], they
would prove to be the exception rather than the rule’. 23 This quotation
illustrates the dangers of the anthropocentric tendency to group a large
variety of animals together when it comes to intentionality. It leads to an
‘all-or-nothing’ stance, embodied in the view that all animals (except for
humans, which are noticeably absent from this group) have beliefs or
intentions, or none of them do.
If we are to attribute beliefs and intentions to non-human animals, we
must avoid an anthropocentric stance. However, we must not confuse
anthropocentrism
with
anthropomorphism.
To
dismiss
anthropomorphism completely may be (to borrow a phrase from Stitch),
‘to throw out the baby with the bathwater’. 24 Ideally, we need to tread
the very fine line between the insights which emerge from the so-called
‘anthropomorphic’ approach on one hand, and the biases of
anthropocentrism on the other.

Part IV
And now, we meet quite often,
Those empty pants and I,
And we never shake or tremble
Ibid.
This division is usually taken for granted as fact in the intentionality debate, as is
reflected in the approach to this very article.
22 See especially T. Regan, The Case For Animal Rights (University of California Press,
Los Angeles, 1983), pp.66-7.
23 Ibid., p.39.
24 S. Stitch, From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief (Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 1983), p.4.
20
21
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We both smile
And we say
“Hi!” 25
At the end of Dr Seuss’s tale, GP and Everyperson establish verbal
communication, being fortunate enough to both use language, and the
same language at that. Language is a medium we use to establish
whether or not beliefs and intentions can be attributed to another being.
If I say ‘I am going to put the cat outside because I think he wants to go
to the toilet’, (assuming we are in the same language community), you
can make sense of my behaviour immediately, and you might then
hesitate to bring the cat back inside immediately, even if you desire to. If
you are not sure about what beliefs and intentions are behind my
behaviour, you can simply ask me and I can give a detailed verbal
response.
Of course, I can always lie to you. Or it may be the case that I am unable
to articulate something, or even that what I do say is misinterpreted. But
by and large, we can say that it is very likely that a human being uses
language to express a desire or an intention, even if to deceive. From this
we can infer that a person who uses language is an intentional being. 26
In this account, I have presented language as a medium for the
articulation of pre-established beliefs and desires. These may still be
present if language is not - it is simply more difficult to ascertain their
presence in this case. However, some philosophers and scientists have
argued that language facilitates the construction of beliefs and desires,
and without it, no being can be said to be intentional at all. 27
Even when we take for granted the assumption inherent in this
argument, that non-human animals do not use language, the argument
remains problematic. Firstly, such an argument assumes that language
precedes beliefs and intentions. If this is the case we cannot explain how
human babies, as non-linguistic beings, make the transition to
linguistically proficient beings, because we cannot argue that these
babies learn by believing that words resemble particular concepts. 28 But
we DO know that young children learn language, and that before doing
Seuss, ‘What Was I Scared Of’?
I will leave out a discussion of the philosophical creature, the Zombie, who exists for
the purpose of undermining this conclusion. I feel that Dennett deals with Zombies
very well in Consciousness Explained, 1991.
27 See D. Davidson, ‘Rational Animals’ Dialectics, 36/4 (1982) and Stitch, ‘From Folk
Psychology to Cognitive Science’ for arguments of this type.
28 This point is also made in Regan, ‘The Case for Animal Rights’, p.44.
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so, must rely on a selection of non-verbal behaviour (such as crying at
the sight of a dog; laughing, smiling and waving one’s arms about when
mum opens the refrigerator etc) in order to express beliefs and desires.
Experience teaches us that beliefs and language must be distinct in order
for the former to precede the latter.
Secondly, by arguing that language is a necessary condition for
intentionality, we risk identifying particular linguistic constructions
with certain beliefs. An example of such a position is given by R.G. Frey,
as discussed by Regan:
According to Frey, animals lack beliefs because
what is believed (the object of belief) is that a given sentence is
true; and since animals lack
linguistic proficiency, they cannot believe that
any sentence is true. That being so, they cannot
believe anything and so, given that beliefs are
necessary for desires, they cannot desire anything. 29
The type of argument put forward by Frey and others leads to
‘paradoxes of intentionality’, 30 which occur when belief tokens are
confused with belief types, or vice-versa. According to Frey’s logic, Fido
the dog cannot be said to believe that the cat is up tree X, unless he
believes ‘Lambie [or the name or some other representation of the cat in
question] is up tree X’, or something almost word-for-word similar.
Such an argument seems preposterously strong: it not only excludes
non-human animals, but also non-English speaking humans, young
children and anyone else who is unable, for whatever reason, to
formulate such a sentence. If we admit that these beings can believe
something is true without possessing the token or sentence for that
belief, then we must allow that possessing a particular belief-token
cannot be a necessary criterion for having a belief. Regan extends this
objection to argue that if a belief-type cannot be reduced to a belieftoken, it makes no sense to claim that belief is constituted by a token. 31
Philosophers such as Davidson, Stitch and Frey, in holding that
language is an essential criterion in attributing intentionality to other
beings, seem to overestimate the role played by language in moulding
beliefs. But language and beliefs are different things. This is evident at
Ibid., p.39.
This phrase is one of Copeland’s. For further discussion, see Copeland, ‘Artificial
Intelligence’, pp.199-200.
31 See Regan, ‘The Case for Animal Rights’, p.41.
29
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times when we are aware that language is inadequate for our purposes,
and we must communicate our beliefs and desires as best we can. It is
also evident at other times, we find that expressing a belief or desire
verbally can clarify it for us. 32 The tension between language on the one
hand and our beliefs, desires and intentions on the other supports the
notion that these are separate and distinct faculties, even if they do
usually function interdependently.
Those who adopt the position that language is necessary for
intentionality often assume that non-human animals do not have
language. Such an assumption discounts the possibility of non-verbal
communication, which, although not as complex as a verbal language,
indicates the presence of beliefs and desires. If the argument about
language is based on the premise that human language is the only way
we can ascertain the presence of second-order beliefs (assuming, for the
moment, that these are a necessary condition for intentionality), it does
not follow that a lack of verbal language signifies a definite lack in
second-order beliefs. 33
Another objection to this argument is the controversial point that
several studies have shown the ability of non-human animals to use
human languages such as sign language. 34 These studies and others like
them consistently undermine the assumption that language is an
exclusively human faculty. If it is through language that second-order
beliefs emerge, we must, in the light of these experiments, acknowledge
that second-order beliefs can be attributed, at least to the non-human
animals who have so far successfully demonstrated some degree of
linguistic competence.
The subject of non-human animal communication is one which is highly
controversial, partly because there is no clear-cut method of
distinguishing those instances of animal behaviour which constitute an
act of communication from those which are not intended to
communicate anything. This is another difficulty arising from the
human position.

Dennett draws attention to this matter in The Intentional Stance: ‘Language enables us
to formulate highly specific desires, but it also forces us on occasion to commit
ourselves to desires altogether more stringent in their conditions of satisfaction than
anything we would otherwise have any reason to endeavour to satisfy’.(p.20).
33 See Part 1.
34 An exposition of such studies is beyond the scope of this article. See for instrance the
work of Sue Savage-Rumbaugh, or discussion in The Great Ape Project, ed. P. Singer
and P. Caveleiri (Fourth Estate Publishers, London, 1993).
32
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It is perhaps for this reason that the major studies pertaining to nonhuman animal communication have all been based on the view that an
animal has language if it has the ability to adopt human language. The
view that non-human animals may have a language limited to their
species does not seem to constitute, in the eyes of scientists, sufficient
evidence that they use language. 35
However, one can object that basing judgements about the linguistic
faculty of non-human animals on their ability to use human language is
a very anthropocentric view. As with the arguments about rationality,
this ‘language’ criterion seems to demand much more for non-human
animals 36 than it does for humans as subjects of a similar situation.

Part V
But then a strange thing happened.
Why, those pants began to cry!
Those pants began to tremble.
They were just as scared as I! 37
The above stanza captures Everyperson’s act of applying the intentional
stance perfectly. She observes GP’s behaviour, assumes that GP must be
similar to her, and infers beliefs and intentions from GP’s behaviour
based on this similarity. Of course, the interpretation that GP is scared is
made after Everyperson’s previous - and incorrect - interpretation
resulting in the conclusion that GP’s beliefs and desires are malignant. 38

For example, see Regan, ‘The Case For Animal Rights’.
In Savage-Rumbaugh’s work, Bonobo Chimpanzees are expected not only to learn a
language, but to communicate in a variety of ways which they are not used to (such as
communicating via an electronic keypad). We expect the Bonobos to learn new
behaviours as well as an entirely new language. On the human scale, this would be like
asking of human subjects that they learn and adopt the principles of echolocation using
squeals instead of words. While such an experiment can teach us a lot about the way
human beings learn, it does not necessarily lend decisive insight into our linguistic
abilities.
37 Seuss, ‘What Was I Scared Of?’
38 One can argue that Everyperson is still justified in applying the intentional stance, as
she was correct in assuming that GP was trying to run to her. It may in fact be the
precision of Everyperson’s judgements that are the grounds for the errors: Everyperson
expects too much of the intentional stance, just as Dennett shows we expect to know
too much about the intentions of a Frog in order to judge whether it is being rational or
not. (See Part II).
35
36
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A possible solution to the problem of ascribing beliefs and intentions to
non-human animals which avoids the pitfalls of adopting the intentional
stance is simple: do not attribute beliefs and intentions at all. In spite of
the fact that such a view is counter-intuitive, it has been taken up by
many scientists as if it were an established truth. This dogmatism, as
Griffin 39 terms it, is widely known as ‘behaviourism’. Though
outmoded in relation to humans, ‘the behaviouristic viewpoint has been
accepted, implicitly, if not explicitly, by most ethologists studying
animal behaviour’. 40
The behaviourist doctrine, in relation to animals, holds that the
intentional explanations of non-human animal behaviour are human
constructions which have no basis in fact whatsoever; instead, all
behaviour is in response to ‘independent variables’ or environmental
stimuli only (including the chemical and neural environment of the
brain and body). 41 Thus behaviourists attempt to account for animal
behaviour in terms of environmental histories and/or chemical analysis
of brain states.
A problem with the behaviourist position is that it is very limited
because it requires the study of complex behavioural histories. Heyes
and Dickinson adopt a behaviourist approach in experiments designed
to determine the presence of animal beliefs. They emphasise the impact
of the environment on animal behaviour, as can be seen in the following
passage:
Our analysis suggests that in order to find out
whether any given example of animal action is
intentional it is essential to measure the effects on
that action of changes in the animal’s environment
which could be expected to alter the content of
the animal’s mental states . 42
I have emphasised what I believe to be the key element of this passage,
which highlights the interpretive function of behaviourism. This
passage thus allows us to see that the criticism that adopting the
intentional stance is based on mere interpretation and speculation can also
be leveled at behaviourists.
See D. Griffin, Animal Thinking (Harvard University Press, Harvard, 1984), pp.18-24.
Ibid., p.19.
41 In explaining the doctrine of behaviourism I have made use of the entry on the
aforementioned from The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 1995, p.67.
42 C. Heyes and A. Dickinson, ‘The Intentionality of Animal Action’, Mind & Language,
5/1, (1990), p.94 - emphasis added.
39
40
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In predicting animal behaviour, the intentional stance has the advantage
over behaviourism: the former is quicker and less complicated than the
latter. Furthermore, the behaviourist, without recourse to a mind, runs
into problems when trying to explain the faculty of memory in nonhuman animals, or prima facie random behaviour. Overall, assuming
beliefs and intentions in animals seems to ‘fit’ the picture altogether
better than behaviourism, which Griffin rejects outright, ‘not so much
because it belittles the value of living animals, but because it leads to a
seriously incomplete and hence misleading picture of reality’. 43
It has been argued by others that the intentional stance cannot be
discarded in favour of behaviourism, because the latter is simply a
redescription strategy, which attempts to draw the same conclusions as
would be drawn from the intentional stance, by simply employing a
more dense vocabulary. Routley makes this point, arguing that
each new redescription, obtained for instance by
iteration of “something like”, is in turn intentional,
and requires itself elimination - not to say
explanation (unless “something like...something
like belief” collapses back to the problematic
“something like belief”). 44
The point is that, in the end, we are no nearer to possessing a selfstanding, complete explanation of behaviour even if we adopt the
behaviourist stance. Instead, we end up with an infinite regress of
intentional explanations.
Those who would hold a behaviourist view of non-human animals and
deny the same for humans are in a tenuous position. Given our
similarities with non-human animals (illustrated by the fact that the
intentional stance often does work in predicting the behaviour of nonhuman animals), it seems unreasonable to assume that intentionality can
actually be applied to humans if it cannot also be applied to non-human
animals. Griffin expresses this point beautifully:
Accepting the reality of our evolutionary
relationship to other animals, it is unparsimonious
to assume a rigid dichotomy of interpretation
which insists that mental experiences have some
D. Griffin, Animal Thinking, (Harvard University Press, Harvard, 1984), p.24.
R. Routley, ‘Alleged Problems in Attributing Beliefs and Intentionality to Animals’,
Inquiry, 24/4, (1981), p.411.
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effect on the behaviour of one species of animals
but none at all on others. 45
Thus if we assume the behaviourist position, we can see that the
problem in not attributing beliefs and intentions to non-human animals
bleeds into the problem of attributing beliefs and intentions to any
animals, including humans.

Part VI
I put my arm around their waist
And sat right down beside them.
I calmed them down,
Poor empty pants
With nobody inside them. 46
Having recognised GP’s status as an intentional being, Everyperson
shows consideration for the feelings and well-being of GP. In this stanza
it is evident that whether or how we attribute beliefs and intentions to
non-human animals is directly related to certain ethical considerations
about our interactions with non-human animals. The standard
‘scientific’ viewpoint is that non-human animals are not intentional
beings, and that they are therefore not within our sphere of moral
concern. This view is espoused by Carruthers, who concludes that
the arguments of Regan and Singer for extending
the principle of equal consideration of interests to animals...were
in any case founded on a false
premise. For both assume that animal desires and
animal experiences are relevantly similar to our
own - in particular, that they are conscious ones. 47
If Carruthers’ argument is correct, and animals are not ‘appropriate
objects of moral concern’, 48 we may be able to perform animal
experiments or practise factory farming without overstepping any
moral boundaries. The fact that our current practices relating to nonhuman animals operate without considering non-human animal

As quoted in Regan, ‘The Case for Animal Rights’, p.35.
Seuss, ‘What Was I Scared Of?’
47 Carruthers, ‘The Animals Issue’, p.191.
48 Ibid., p.193.
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interests as equal to our own would seem to indicate that the above
view is held by many people in, if not most members of, our society.
Such established practices and customs cannot be taken lightly, and
have an inestimable influence on philosophical or scientific
investigations into the subject of non-human animal intentionality. One
of the problems, then, in attributing beliefs and intentionality to nonhuman animals may be that to do so would be to acknowledge that nonhuman animals are worthy of moral consideration, which would almost
definitely entail the cessation of the aforementioned practices. The
reluctance of people to attribute intentionality to non-human animals
may therefore have more to do with a desire to continue current
practises involving animals than it has to do with the quality or indeed
the quantity of the evidence for or against non-human animal
intentionality.
The question which Carruthers and other proponents of this view fail to
address adequately is whether or not moral consideration of other
beings should hinge on the attribution of beliefs and intentions by us. If
we answer that it should, we have yet to gather conclusive evidence that
non-human animals are or are not intentional beings. But it is also
possible that we can include non-human animals in our moral sphere,
even if we cannot determine whether a being is intentional or not. For
instance, it is certainly possible to imagine that pain behaviour exhibited
by a slug (I choose a slug for my example because a slug is a less-likely
candidate for intentionality) writhing in salt is indicative of genuine
suffering, even if we are not willing to attribute belief and intentions, as
we know them, to such a creature.
Surely, when possible beings of moral concern are in question, it is
pertinent to err on the side of caution rather than to jump to conclusions
which, if it were discovered that non-human animals were intentional
beings worthy of our moral consideration, would have done
incalculable damage in the meantime.

Conclusion
I have argued that there are several problems inherent in the intentional
stance,
arising
from the potential anthropocentrism and
anthropomorphism of the human interpreter. Sections II, III and IV
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particularly emphasise the fact that a major problem in attributing
beliefs and intentions to non-human animals lies in the type of
assumptions inherent in the typical intentional stance. I have shown that
these assumptions, such as that of rationality and of the faculty of
language, lead to conditions which may be too stringent in the case of
non-human animals, whereas weaker indications of such would be
enough to satisfy criteria for attributing beliefs and intentions to
humans.
On the other hand, there are equally problems if we choose not to
attribute intentionality to non-human animals, and these in fact cause
more problems than adopting the intentional stance in the first place. As
my discussion of behaviourism in Part V illustrates, the grounds for
attributing beliefs and intentions to humans are undermined if we do
not acknowledge the presence of such in non-human animals. In light of
this point, a tenuous position such as animal behaviourism is more
likely to be adopted toward non-human animals only, in order to avoid
facing the possibility of having to treat non-human animals as objects of
moral concern.
Nonetheless, because it is so accessible and relatively reliable, most of us
cannot avoid adopting - at one stage or another - the intentional stance
toward another being. However, just as Everyperson’s experience
illustrates, such a stance is fallible. To draw any reliable conclusions the
stance must not be applied without consideration of contingencies,
differences between the non-human animals in question and ourselves,
and other variables. It is of too much value to be dismissed. And there
remains the possibility that, for all of our scientific studies, the
intentional stance (applied cautiously) may remain the best way to
understand and predict the behaviour of non-human animals. This final
point, I believe, is one which Thomas Nagel has been making all along.
In his words:
There are things about the world and life and
ourselves that cannot be adequately understood
from a maximally objective standpoint, however
much it may extend our understanding beyond the
point from which we started. A great deal is
essentially connected to a particular point of view,
or type of point of view, and the attempt to give a
complete account of the world in objective terms
detached from these perspectives inevitably leads
to false reductions or outright denial that certain
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patently real phenomena exist at all. 49
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